

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting DCI

One cannot take Trofimukov's remarks as authoritative, but gives some idea how Soviet leadership might come out. Your talking points address his major points.

State Dept. review completed



Date 30 April 82

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/28/02 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
 TAGS: MNUC, PARM
 SUBJECT: START -- TROFIMENKO'S VIEWS

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1. (C) SUMMARY: IN PRIVATE REMARKS TO US THE USA INSTITUTE'S GENRIKH TROFIMENKO CAUTIONS THE U.S.: 1) NOT TO EXPECT THE USSR TO AGREE TO REDUCTIONS IN START WHILE THE U.S. AGREES ONLY TO FOREGO NEW STRATEGIC ARMS DEPLOYMENTS, 2) NOT TO PURCHASE A COUNTING RULE BASED ONLY ON THROWWEIGHT, AND 3) IF THE U.S. PROPOSES A COMBINATION OF FACTORS TO DETERMINE A NEW COUNTING RULE, ACCURACY ALSO SHOULD LOGICALLY BE INCLUDED. TROFIMENKO PROPOSES THAT START SHOULD SPECIFY LIMITS ON FUTURE ARMS THAT ARE MORE PRECISE THAN THOSE IN SALT II, SUCH AS THE NEW TYPE RULE. TROFIMENKO SAID HE INFERRED FROM SECRETARY HAIG'S GEORGETOWN SPEECH THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT SEEK TO REVISE THE ABM TREATY. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) IN AN APRIL 26 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF. THE CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT AT THE USA INSTITUTE, GENRIKH TROFIMENKO, MADE SEVERAL COMMENTS OF INTEREST ON START (SEPTEL REPORTS HIS COMMENTS ON ICBM VULNERABILITY):

- THE SOVIET APPROACH TO START WILL DEPEND ON THE U.S., WHETHER IT PRESENTS AN "OPEN LIST" OF DEMANDS OR SEEKS TO MODIFY SALT II.

- IF THE U.S. DECIDES TO COUNT ONLY THROWWEIGHT, "IT WILL NOT GET AWAY WITH THIS."

- IF A COMBINATION OF FACTORS IS USED THEN LOGICALLY WE SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ACCURACY, BUT HOW DO WE MEASURE THIS?

- YOU THINK A START AGREEMENT SHOULD MAKE THE USSR TAKE SEVERAL STEPS DOWN, AND IN RETURN THE U.S. WOULD "THINK UP" FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS WHICH IT WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE.

- IF YOU WANT TO DO THIS, LET'S SPEAK ABOUT BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET FUTURE SYSTEMS. IN SALT II WE AGREED TO ONE NEW TYPE OF MISSILE. IN START PERHAPS WE SHOULD

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- SPECIFY LIMITS ON FUTURE ARMS THAT ARE MORE PRECISE ?
- THAN THOSE IN SALT II.
-
- IN HIS SPEECH AT GEORGETOWN, SECRETARY HAIG HAD
- SOME GOOD WORDS TO SAY ABOUT THE ABM TREATY. I
- READ THIS TO MEAN THAT YOU DO NOT WANT TO REVISE IT.

COMMENT

3. (C) TROFIMENKO REITERATES THE WELL-KNOWN POINT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PREFER THAT THE U.S. RETAIN AS MUCH OF SALT II AS POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH TROFIMENKO APPEARS TO CAUTION AGAINST WEIGHTING THROWWEIGHT TOO HEAVILY IN A NEW UNIT OF ACCOUNT, HE DOES NOT RULE OUT TAKING IT INTO ACCOUNT AS A FACTOR. HE SEEMS TO ASSUME, BY THE WAY, THAT THROWWEIGHT WOULD ENTER DIRECTLY INTO THE COUNTING RULE, RATHER THAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SOME OTHER WAY.

4. (C) TROFIMENKO'S SUGGESTION THAT ACCURACY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT SUGGESTS A SOVIET PERCEPTION THAT THE MX AND D-5 WILL BE MORE ACCURATE THAN THE MOST ACCURATE VERSIONS OF THE SS-18 AND SS-19, AND HENCE THE MX/D-5 COULD ACHIEVE HIGHER PROBABILITIES OF SILENT DESTRUCTION WITH LESS THROWWEIGHT THAN SOVIET MISSILES. THUS, TROFIMENKO SEEMS TO BE SAYING THE SOVIETS MAY INTRODUCE THE ACCURACY FACTOR INTO THE TALKS AS A WAY TO REBUT OUR

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ARGUMENTS FOR A NEW UNIT OF ACCOUNT (PARTICULARLY ONE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THROWWEIGHT), AND TO ADD A NEW AND COMPLICATING ELEMENT WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR BOTH SIDES TO ESTIMATE AND VERIFY.

5. (C) FINALLY, TROFIMENKO ARGUES A POSITION THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO HEAR MORE OF: THE USSR AND THE U.S. AGREED IN 1979 THAT THERE WAS A "BALANCE," THE USSR THINKS A BALANCE PERSISTS, AND THEREFORE

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THE U.S. CANNOT EXPECT THE USSR TO AGREE IN START
TO UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS. HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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